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HONORS THESIS ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to identify the extent to which firms in the services industries 
manage earnings by selling fixed assets and long-held investments. My design 
utilizes two regression equations: the first is to estimate normal levels of gains on 
asset sales and the second is to determine whether abnormally high gains on 
asset sales are associated with firms that have an incentive to manage earnings. 
Such firms are identified by just beating one of two benchmarks: zero earnings or 
last year’s earnings. My results imply that there is no significant correlation 
between firms with an incentive to manage earnings and abnormally high gains 
on asset sales, which is consistent with prior literature.
Managing Earnings through the Sale of Assets
Introduction
Many topics in financial accounting are black and white: there is little room for 
interpretation. Accounting standards in the United States are established by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and these standards are often described as “rules- 
based,” supporting the notion that the FASB tries to leave very little grey area in their 
standards so that companies are as uniform in their reporting as possible. Comparability 
in accounting helps financial statement users (such as investors and creditors) identify 
similarities and differences between companies, and helps ensure efficient allocation o f 
capital in financial markets.
Despite these rules-based accounting standards, there is still a role for judgment 
and estimation in accounting. The manipulation o f financial accounting reports is often 
referred to as earnings management, and it is one o f a few areas in financial accounting 
which fascinate me. The line between managing earnings and intentionally misstating 
financial statements is blurry, and the ethical and legal aspects o f earnings management 
are just as unclear. I enjoy exploring and investigating ambiguous subjects, so a research 
project examining earnings management suits me well.
My research goal is to discover how prevalent earnings management is in 
business. It would be difficult to generalize about all companies using every earnings 
management technique, so in my study, I will narrow my focus to detecting only one 
technique o f earnings management in one group o f industries. Research on earnings
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management is very important. Accounting standard-setters and legislators need to know 
the extent to which managers manage earnings so that they can decide whether to enact 
laws or regulations against such behavior. It is my hope that my paper will reinforce the 
importance o f this issue and will add new insights to the extant literature on this topic. 
L iterature Review
Earnings management is a very controversial issue in financial reporting in which 
managers intentionally manipulate earnings numbers either to help smooth income 
(reduce volatility in reported earnings) or to maximize reported earnings. Managers have 
an incentive to report the best earnings numbers possible to increase bonuses and raise 
the company’s stock price, which, in turn, increases the value o f the managers’ stock 
options. One o f the reasons that earnings management is such a contentious issue is that it 
is difficult to detect.
Managers can manage earnings using a variety o f methods, usually categorized as 
either manipulation o f accruals or real earnings management. Manipulation o f accruals 
occurs when managers alter their estimates o f accrual accounts, which can affect net 
income.1 Managers engage in real earnings management when they make operating 
decisions, such as selling assets or producing more inventory, to improve the company’s 
earnings. Since real earnings management involves operating decisions, as opposed to 
changes in estimates, it is generally much more difficult to detect, as there is a possibility 
the operating decisions were made for legitimate business purposes.
Earnings management has been a popular subject o f research for the past few 
decades. Schipper (1989) reviews much o f the literature up to the point of her publication
'Some financial transactions are recorded at estimated amounts, and those are called accruals. Some accrual accounts (such as 
allowance for doubtful accounts) also affect expense accounts, which changes net income. Many o f these accruals require judgments, 
which allow for managers to manipulate earnings by either overestimating or underestimating them.
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and provides some o f her own insights on the subject, focusing mainly on the 
manipulation o f accruals. She finds that, up to that point, most research consisted of 
creating models that predicted normal levels o f accruals, then identifying companies 
whose accruals appeared to be abnormal. Baber et al. (1991) focus more on real earnings 
management through discretionary spending on research and development (R&D). R&D 
expenditures have been a particularly common area o f study in earnings management, 
probably because they must be separately disclosed, rather than grouped into selling, 
general and administrative (SG&A) expense. Roychowdhury (2006) discovers that firms 
with earnings just above zero use many other real methods to manage earnings, including 
price discounts and sales promotions (to drive sales) and overproduction (to lower cost o f 
goods sold).
Bartov (1993) finds that managers tend to time sales o f fixed assets and 
investments to help either smooth earnings or meet debt covenants. Hermann et al. (2002) 
research management behavior in Japan and also find that managers sell fixed assets and 
securities in order to manage earnings. The benchmark for Hermann et al. (2002) was an 
internal forecast developed by management.
Graham et al. (2005) survey 401 financial executives about financial reporting 
and how it affects their decisions. Evidence from the survey indicates that 78% of 
financial executives would sacrifice economic value in order to meet earnings 
benchmarks or smooth earnings. Graham et al. (2005) find that, generally, executives are 
chiefly concerned with the company’s reputation and stock price (as well as their own 
careers), so they are willing to sacrifice economic value and/or negatively affect cash 
flow. Another notable discovery from their research is that the surveyed executives prefer
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to use real earnings management techniques over accounting-based techniques (i.e., 
manipulation of accruals).
Bennet and Bradbury (2010) find evidence o f earnings management through 
greater sales and reduced inventory, which are real activities, but did not detect any 
manipulation o f accruals. Gunny (2010) also finds evidence of real earnings 
management. According to her research, there is a positive correlation between meeting 
or just beating earnings benchmarks (i.e., zero earnings or last year’s earnings) and the 
use of real earnings management. What’s more, Gunny (2010) discovers that companies 
that use real earnings management to meet benchmarks have better subsequent 
performance than companies that do not use earnings management and just miss out on 
earnings benchmarks. This confirms that there are real benefits to using real earnings 
management. She concludes that one reason for the better performance is due to 
signaling, or the notion that companies manage their earnings to try to show the true 
underlying value of the firm. This suggests that earnings management can be a positive 
tool used to report even more accurate information about companies. That, however, is 
not supported by the observations o f Graham et al. (2005), who report that managers 
willingly sacrifice the economic value o f their firms to manage earnings.
Eldenburg et al. (2011) find evidence o f real earnings management in non-profit 
hospitals. These hospitals have the incentive to positively manage earnings to report 
positive income but also to manage earnings negatively to avoid excessive earnings and 
thereby giving the impression that they are not using all o f their resources effectively. 
Eldenburg et al. (2011) determine that to meet/beat the benchmark o f zero earnings, 
managers cut expenditures from non-operating and non-revenue-generating activities. To
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cut back earnings, however, managers tend to dispose of fixed assets, generating losses 
and decreasing net income.
Cohen et al. (2008) determine that before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) went 
into effect in 2002, companies were much more prone to engage in earnings management 
through manipulation o f accruals. After SOX went into effect, however, companies 
quickly switched to real earnings management techniques, which are more difficult to 
detect than manipulating accruals, to disguise their actions to avoid reprimand. CEOs and 
CFOs switched to the less risky real earnings management because, once SOX was 
enacted, the individuals in both o f these positions became personally responsible for 
certifying the accuracy and completeness o f the company’s financial statements. Hunton 
et al.’s (2006) findings mirror those o f Cohen et al. (2008). Hunton et al. (2006) find that 
managers are less likely to manage earnings in areas with greater transparency, so they 
alter their techniques to exploit areas that are less visible to both the public and 
regulators. Hirst and Hopkins (1998) conduct a similar study, focusing more on analysts’ 
behavior rather than management’s. This type o f research is important because it helps us 
understand how earnings management affects analysts’ opinions and how they value 
companies’ stock.
Hirst and Hopkins (1998) try to determine, based on two different methods of 
disclosure, how analysts respond to the sale o f available-for-sale securities for the 
purpose of managing earnings upwards. They ask four groups of buy-side equity analysts 
to value a company’s stock price after they present a different set o f financial statements 
to each group. The first group is given financial statements that contain no earnings 
management with comprehensive income (Cl) reported in the income statement while the
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second group has financial statements that do include earnings management with Cl 
disclosed the same way. The last two groups have financial statements with Cl included 
in the statement o f stockholders’ equity, however one set contains earnings management 
while the other does not.
Hirst and Hopkins (1998) find that Cl disclosure in the income statement leads to 
similar stock price valuations, regardless o f whether there was earnings management. 
However, in the statement o f stockholders’ equity disclosure, analysts give a higher stock 
price to the financial statements that included earnings management. Hirst and Hopkins 
(1998) conclude that this occurs because analysts are more likely to consider the earnings 
management if  it is transparently reported on a statement o f performance (i.e., the income 
statement), and will factor it out o f their valuation. However, they are less likely to detect 
the earnings management if  Cl is presented on the statement of stockholders’ equity. 
Since GAAP currently allows reporting entities to include Cl on the statement of 
stockholders’ equity (and most elect to), there is an increased chance o f earnings 
management through the sale of available-for-sale securities.2 
Hypothesis Development
I derive my hypothesis from Gunny’s (2010) study on how real earnings 
management is associated with future performance. Unlike Gunny, though, I do not 
hypothesize on how earnings management and future performance are related. Instead, I 
focus on uncovering evidence o f earnings management through the use o f real activities, 
specifically the sale o f assets. I narrow the focus o f my hypothesis even more by only 
considering firms in the services industries. I then target firms with an incentive to 
manage earnings, just as Gunny (2010) did, by distinguishing firms that just meet two
2Due to an Accounting Standard Update in 2011, the method of reporting comprehensive income in the statement o f  stockholders’ 
equity will no longer be allowed. This could have implications for earnings management, making it more difficult.
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particular benchmarks. These two benchmarks are zero earnings and last year’s earnings, 
the same two used in Gunny’s (2010) study. I use these two benchmarks because I want 
to maintain comparability to Gunny’s (2010) study and also because they are easy to 
determine. Although Gunny (2010) did not find any evidence o f real earnings 
management through asset sales, I believe that I will find such evidence with my more 
exclusive sample, which leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Firms that just meet either zero earnings or last year’s
earnings display signs o f  earnings management through abnormal 
gains and losses on the sale o f assets.
Research Design
The sample was derived from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), through 
its COMPUSTAT North America database, and consists o f all firms in the services 
industries (SIC codes 7000-8999). I included annual data for firms spanning from 1988 
through 2006 (19 years). I limited my sample to pre-2007 data so that none o f the effects 
o f the late-2000s recession would be included in my dataset. Also, consistent with Gunny 
(2010), I began with year 1988 because that was the first year that COMPUSTAT had 
data on income from asset sales. The sample contains 25,547 observations and 3,706 
firms.
The design I use is taken directly from Gunny (2010). I use her design because it 
is well-structured, yet it did not uncover any evidence o f earnings management through 
asset sales. This may be due to the fact that her sample included all industries (except the 
financial and utilities industries), so I targeted firms in the services industries since asset 
sales behavior is probably more consistent in similar industries and will therefore lead to
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a more reliable regression analysis. I chose to target services industries because, after 
analyzing the asset sales behavior of many different industries, I found that firms in the 
services industries tend to sell more assets than any other industry -  besides the financial 
industry -  and I believe that the more asset sales data there is, the stronger the results of 
the analysis will be. I chose not to target the financial industry because, as Gunny (2010) 
explains, that industry is heavily regulated and would need a much different research 
design tailored to it.
This design calls for two separate regression analyses: the first regression will 
determine the expected level of gains on asset sales and the second will determine if  there 
is an association between firms having an incentive to manage earnings and abnormally 
high gains on asset sales measured as the residuals from the first regression (Gunny 
2010).
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= income from asset sales 
= total assets
= the natural logarithm of market value
= Tobin’s Q, calculated as (market value + preferred stock + long- and short­
term debt) / lagged total assets
= internal funds, calculated as (income before extraordinary items + 
depreciation and amortization + research and development expense)
= long-lived asset sales 
= long-lived investment sales
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All o f the variables in Gunny’s (2010) design are considered to be significant in 
determining a firm’s level o f gains on asset sales. Market value is included in the formula 
to control for size effects. Internal funds is another control variable which represent 
reduced funds available for investment. Tobin’s Q indicates the marginal benefit to the 
marginal cost of adding a new unit o f investment, which has a large bearing on whether a 
firm will sell long-lived assets (Gunny 2010).
For this design to function properly, income from asset sales, long-lived asset 
sales and long-lived investment sales must be monotonic, meaning they must all enter the 
equation with the same sign (positive or negative). Since it is possible for firms to have 
negative income from asset sales but impossible to have negative sales on assets, I 
converted all asset and investment sales to negative for observations where the income 
from asset sales was negative. Accordingly, the coefficients on the asset and investment 
sales variables are expected to be positive. High residuals from this equation are a signal 
o f abnormal gains or losses through asset sales, which may be the result o f earnings 
management (Gunny 2010).
For this analysis to be successful, it is necessary to separate firms that have an 
incentive to manage earnings with those who do not. To accomplish this, I employ the 
same technique Gunny (2010) uses to distinguish the firms. I use two different 
benchmarks to indicate an incentive to manage earnings: (1) net income just above $0 
and (2) net income just above last year’s earnings. To determine which firms just beat $0 
earnings, I divide net income by total assets from the beginning o f the year, and any firm 
with a result between zero and 0.01 is classified as BENCH (a firm which has an 
incentive to manage earnings). For the second benchmark, I subtract last year’s net
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income from this year’s, and then divide the result by total assets at the beginning of the 
year. As with the previous benchmark, any firm with a result between zero and 0.01 is 
labeled BENCH.
<Insert Table 1 here>
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the estimated levels o f gain on asset sales. The entire sample was 
run through the regression equation from the previous section in SPSS vl9. Unlike 
Gunny (2010), I have not winsorized the results at all so that all observations were 
included in the analysis. Except for the natural logarithm of market value (MV), each o f 
the coefficients is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In Gunny’s (2010) study, MV  
was also not statistically significant. This independent variable was included to control 
for size effects, so it appears that this control may not be necessary. The coefficients in 
Table 1 for ASales and ISales are both significantly greater than the corresponding 
coefficients in Gunny’s (2010) study, which could be due to the fact that there are greater 
sales o f assets and investments in the services industries than there are on average. Also, 
both coefficients in this study are significant, whereas only ASales in Gunny’s (2010) 
research was significant. The statistical significance o f both coefficients could be 
explained by the fact that firms in the services industries have more similar asset sales 
behavior than do firms across all industries. Another factor that supports similar industry 
behavior is the adjusted R2 in this study o f 0.81, which is significantly higher than 
Gunny’s (2010) adjusted R2 o f 0.28.
<Insert Table 2 here>
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Table 2 presents statistics related to the residuals from the first regression. I 
chose not to winsorize these results either, so that all observations would be included in 
the analysis. The standard deviation for the residuals in my model is much higher than it 
is in Gunny’s (2010) study, which suggests that there is much more variety in the 
residuals o f this study than in hers.
<Insert Table 3 here>
Table 3 shows Pearson correlations between the residuals and other 
characteristics from the firms. The only significant correlation for Abnormal GainAsset is 
with MTB, which is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. In Gunny’s (2010) study, no 
variables had any statistically significant correlation with the residuals.
Results
I use the same equation as Gunny (2010) to determine the association between 
firms just meeting earnings benchmarks (zero earnings, last year’s earnings) and 
engaging in earnings management:
Abnormal GainAssett =  y0 +  Y\BENCHt +  YzSIZEt +  y3M7T?t +  +  et
BENCH = an indicator variable that equals one if  (1) net income divided by total assets 
at the beginning o f the year is between zero and 0.01 or (2) the change in net 
income divided by total assets at the beginning o f the year is between zero 
and 0.01; otherwise, the variable equals zero 
SIZE = the natural logarithm o f total assets
MTB = market to book: the market value o f equity divided by the book value of 
equity
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ROA = income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the beginning o f 
the year
In this second regression equation, the residuals from the first regression enter this 
one as the dependent variable. Gunny (2010) multiplied Abnormal GainAsset by (-1) so 
that low values would represent earnings management, but I do not do this. So, in this 
equation, high values are consistent with earnings management, and the predicted 
coefficient on BENCH is positive. SIZE is a control variable for size effects while MTB 
controls for opportunities to grow. ROA controls for the concern that earnings 
management is correlated to performance (Gunny 2010).
<Insert Table 4 here>
Table 4 displays the results from the second regression analysis. Consistent with 
Gunny’s (2010) findings, the BENCH coefficient is close to zero and is not statistically 
significant. This indicates that, for the services industries, there is no association between 
companies that barely beat earnings benchmarks and abnormally high gains on asset 
sales, which refutes my hypothesis.
<Insert Table 5 here>
Table 5 shows the percentage o f BENCH firms by industry (SIC code). In the 
services industries overall, 9.31% of firms just beat earnings benchmarks. When looking 
at individual industries, the percentage ranges from 0.00% to 28.01%. According to the 
hypothesis, industries with a higher percentage o f BENCH firms should engage in more 
earnings management. With that in mind, I tried to apply the same regression equations in 
this study to industries 75 and 70, but the samples were not large enough to draw 
significant results.
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Sum m ary and Conclusions
This paper contributes to the body of literature on the identification o f earnings 
management. I focus on firms engaging in real earnings management through the sale of 
fixed assets and long-lived investments. I model my research design after Gunny (2010), 
but focus on firms in the services industries. In this design, I estimate the normal levels of 
gains on asset sales for the entire sample and then identify firms with an incentive to 
manage earnings {BENCH firms) and evaluate whether these firms are associated with 
abnormally high gains on asset sales. Gunny (2010) did not find any significant 
correlation between abnormally high gains on asset sales and BENCH firms, and I also 
found no such correlation in my study.
I did attempt to apply the same regression analysis to two specific industries that 
had a greater proportion o f BENCH firms, but the samples were too small. One possible 
opportunity for further study would be to aggregate industries with a high proportion o f 
BENCH firms and apply Gunny’s (2010) regression on that sample. Another research 
opportunity would be to use a similar design to the one in this paper and apply it to 
quarterly financial statements rather than annual ones. This would be beneficial because 
firms are probably more likely to manage earnings closer to year-end (fourth quarter), so 
it would be easier to identify that behavior when just examining that particular quarter. 
One more potential area for study is comprehensive income (Cl) disclosure and how it 
affects earnings management. This would build on Hirst and Hopkins’ (1998) study and 
would be significant because of the change in reporting requirements, prohibiting firms 
from presenting Cl on the statement of stockholders’ equity. This would make it more
13




I was excited to begin my Capstone project at the beginning of the semester. At 
the end of the previous semester, Dr. Matuszewski, my faculty adviser, and I picked out a 
topic to research that I was very interested in: earnings management. I was fascinated by 
this subject because it has no clear ethical or legal boundaries and it is such a 
controversial issue. After we decided on the topic, my mind raced, thinking of all the 
different things I could do. I wanted to create a case study, and then I wanted to generate 
a revolutionary piece o f research, and then I wanted to do something else. But whatever 
my idea was at the time, I thought in my head that I was going to be trailblazing, doing 
something new and inventive that no one had ever seen before. After the first couple of 
meetings with Dr. Matuszewski, I realized I would be doing no such thing.
I was first asked to review the literature that related to my topic, a task that I 
found to be tedious and time-consuming. There were many times when I found my mind 
trailing off as I was reading the papers. Much o f the subject matter was over my head and 
I had to concentrate in order to comprehend a lot o f the writing. Once I reviewed the 
literature, I had to fashion my study around the research that I read about. I tweaked my 
design a few times and did not actually have my design set until the second half o f the 
semester -  and I ended up using the same design as one o f the papers I had read. I felt 
disappointed that I could not even come up with a design o f my own, but I had severely 
underestimated the complexity o f some o f the regression equations in the earnings 
management literature. It was not until I was actually inputting the information into SPSS 
that I fully realized what the design was supposed to measure. But before I could use 
SPSS, I needed to get the data into a usable format.
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This part was difficult because the data I had gotten from the WRDS database did 
not include variables for last year’s assets and last year’s net income, two measures I had 
to have to run the regression analysis. To get these variables, I had to do some 
manipulating in Excel. The strange thing is, I found this part of the project the most 
exciting. Before I tried to create the variables, I would daydream about ways to 
manipulate the data and utilize formulas to make my job as easy as possible. Once I 
figured out how to create the variables using the least amount of effort, I felt extremely 
satisfied. Then my task was to run the regression and write up my results.
Unfortunately, my results did not come out as I had hypothesized. At this point, I 
was disappointed all over again; I stole a research design from someone else and did not 
get any significant results. I actually thought for a moment that this was all a waste of 
time. Then I remembered how Dr. Matuszewski would stress to me that the main goal of 
this project was to learn about the research process, and I quickly realized that this was 
anything but a waste o f time. The process was, at times, stressful, satisfying and 
frustrating, but always challenging and rewarding. I know so much more about research 
and have much more o f an appreciation for it now. I was not able to blaze any trails with 
my research, or even draw any significant results from it, but at least I learned from it.
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TABLE 1
Estimation o f the normal level o f gain on asset sales






Q t 0.000 0.012
IN T t 
A t -1
0.000 0.002
A S a le s t 
At-1
0.422 0.000











Residuals .000 .0129 .35
TABLE 3
Pearson correlation matrix
SIZE MTB ROA Q INT
MTB .011*
ROA .033*** .036***
Q -.035*** -.083*** -.679***
INT .033*** .036*** -.668***
Abnormal .009 .085*** -.008 .000 .000
*/**/*** represent statistical significance at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 levels
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TABLE 4











Percentage o f firms that just beat earnings benchmarks by SIC code
SIC Code xion-BENCH BENCH
75 (307) 71.99% 28.01%
70 (744) 79.44% 20.56%
72 (356) 80.06% 19.94%
83 (261) 84.67% 15.33%
79(1,637) 86.87% 13.13%
78 (1,026) 89.86% 10.14%
80 (2,546) 90.06% 9.94%
87 (2,631) 90.65% 9.35%
76 (93) 91.40% 8.60%
82 (466) 92.27% 7.73%
73 (15,448) 92.45% 7.55%
81 (23) 95.65% 4.35%
86 (4) 100.00% 0.00%
89(5) 100.00% 0.00%
Total (25,547) 90.69% 9.31%
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